Projekt

In this international three-day conference, the Institute of Philosophy Graz together with the Max-Planck-Institute Freiburg invites renowned experts in the philosophy of law and criminal law theory to debate the meaning and scope of the concept of individual rights in criminal law.

According to the common view in criminal law theory, compliance with legal obligations is owed not to the individuals protected by the law, but to the state. Thus, criminal law theorist rarely conceive of individuals as holders of normative claims against one another, but merely as beneficiaries of restrictions. Contrary to the predominant view, our aim is to explore the argumentative and theoretical space to show that individual rights have a central role in criminal law. We ask questions about the possibility, nature, and normative implications of rights in criminal law:

- Is the violation of rights the reason for criminalizing behavior?

- To whom do subjects of rights owe compliance with criminal law provisions?

In doing so, we touch upon various topics in both legal theory and legal ethics, such as theories of rights, the justification of punishment, criminal-tort-law distinction, restorative justice, victims' rights in procedure, or consent in criminal law.